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 In K. Manktelow and M.-C. Chung (Eds.) (2004)
Psychology of reasoning. Theoretical and historical perspectives
(pp. 214-240).  Hove: Psychology Press.
Some precursors of current theories of syllogistic reasoning
Guy Politzer
CNRS, Saint-Denis, France
Syllogisms have a long logical and philosophical history.  At first sight, one
might wonder whether this history may be of any interest to
experimental psychologists. Respect for the autonomy of psychology and
the fear of logicism might explain such a negative attitude. Still, as will be
shown in this chapter, investigators of human reasoning have a great deal
to learn from an examination of logical and philosophical theories of the
syllogism because, through the exposition of their principles and methods
of resolution, these often make use of, and disclose, processes that are
psychological in nature.
The work of the German psychologist, G. Störring, published in 1908,
which in all likelihood contains the first series of psychological
experiments on syllogistic reasoning ever published, will be taken as a
point of departure and reference. Indeed, it is interesting, if only for the
sake of curiosity, to go back to the origins, but this is only a secondary
motivation. The main reason to comment on the Störring study is that it
contains a few ideas of capital importance, which either passed unnoticed
or were forgotten. And it turns out that the main current approaches to
syllogistic reasoning are based on a resurrection of the same ideas which
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can, in turn, be traced back to the writings of philosophers and logicians of
the past, including Aristotle. In brief, the logico-philosophical and
psychological histories of syllogistic reasoning and its psychological
explanation are intertwined.
The Störring study
In 1908, Störring published a one-hundred-and-twenty-seven-page article
devoted to the experimental study of two areas in deductive reasoning:
relational and syllogistic. We will consider only the latter (note 1). The
paper has a very short introduction showing psychologism to be the
author's implicit frame of reference; he presents his experimental study as
an attempt to provide an answer to two questions debated between
logicians: Is every conclusion inferred on the basis of spatial
representations? Does the conclusion result from a synthesis of the terms
in the premises, or does it result from a process of comparison?
The method is succinctly described: the administration was individual;
premises were visually presented and remained visible until the
participants had responded. They were asked to answer with absolute
certainty, an instruction repeated on every trial. The response times were
measured and then a clinical interview started, whose aim was to make
the participants specify, from a descriptive point of view, how they
understood each premise and generated the conclusion. The propositions
had an abstract content: letters of the alphabet stood for the three classes
and the formulation adopted was such that a syllogism like EI-1 would be:
no A belong [German Gehören] to class D;  some T belong to class A ∴ ? (note
2).
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The paper has no explicit hypotheses, no experimental design, no
statistical treatment and there were only four participants. Although this
seems irredeemable to our current standards, after closer examination, it
appears that the paper contains a number of essential observations,
reviewed below, that certainly make it abreast with modern studies.
The figural effect
First, the author noticed longer response times when the major premise is
in the first position as compared with the case where it is in the second
position. This inversion amounts to comparing the first and the fourth
figures (note 3). Three quarters of a century later, this difference in
difficulty was observed by Johnson-Laird & Bara (1984) who showed that
fewer errors and shorter latencies occurred on the fourth figure than on
the others. They also observed that most of the problems in the first and
fourth figures produce a response bias, namely all the subjects tended to
give a response following the S P order on the first figure and the P S
order on the fourth figure.  Störring's explanation for the increase in
response time was that
when the major premise is in the first position, the
identification of the elements that function as a middle term
can occur only after reading the premises. When the major
premise occupies the second place, it occurs while reading and
comprehending.
In brief, there is a difference in difficulty to integrate the premises and this
explanation foreshadows that of the mental model theory and its
interpretation of the figural effect in terms of the ease of integration of the
premises in working memory.
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Strategies
The next discovery made by Störring is far more important. Throughout
his paper he emphasizes that people adopt strategies to solve syllogisms,
and he distinguishes two of them. The first one is a visual representation
of the premises: often people imagine circles standing for classes,
sometimes they imagine clusters of letters standing for members of
classes (note 4); then, the conclusion is read off these configurations. The
other strategy is verbal: it concerns the reformulation of the premises and
efforts to identify two terms with each other, on which more will be
commented below.
Obviously, Störring described the two types of strategy rediscovered by
Ford (1995) with a similar method (interview and verbal report). She
observed two kinds of participants: some made drawings such as circles
or squares to represent the classes; some others made transformations on
the terms, such as replacing a term by another, rewriting a syllogism in
the form of an equation, or drawing arrows to relate terms. Nowadays it
seems very likely that not all individuals tackle syllogisms in the same
manner: some rely on a semantic or analogical strategy of the type
hypothesized by mental model theory; some rely on a syntactic
treatment. One moral of the Störring experiments is that investigators
have much to gain from looking for possible individual processes and
differences; from this point of view, the administration of paper-and-
pencil questionnaires seems of little use. Indeed, Newell (1981) criticized
what he called the "fixed-method fallacy" but this was avoided in only a
few studies such as Ford's and Bucciarelli &Johnson-Laird's (1999).
The process of "insertion"
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Unlike the two previous observations, which by now can be considered
well-known established phenomena, the third one has been recognized
only recently by a few authors. It will be argued later that this observation
might well be the most important ever made on the psychology of
syllogisms, because it reveals the essence of syllogisms and possibly the
way they are solved, according to one major theoretical approach.
Let us follow the reports of Störring's subjects who had to solve the IA-4
syllogism: some P belong to class M;  all the M belong to class S ∴ ? One
participant said: "all the M, including some P, belong to class S." Another
one commented: "these M, to which some P belong, belong to class S". Or
take a syllogism in the first figure with a negative premise, EA-1: no M
belong to class P;  all the S belong to class M ∴ ?  One participant
commented: "One can say the same thing about S as about M" and he
went on saying that he "inserted" (his own words) S in the place of M,
hence the conclusion "no S belong to class P". The same participant
reported for IE-4 (some P belong to class M;  no M belong to class S ∴ ?):
"What is said of M can also be said of some P" to conclude correctly "some
P do not belong to class S".
These are instances of the various ways of expressing a common process
by which subjects select the end term of one premise and insert it by the
side of the middle term in the other premise. And to reach the conclusion
it will suffice to extract it from the composite expression: "the concluding
sentence is obtained by abstraction of a part of what has been asserted as
a result of the insertion", that is, in the first example, from all the M,
including some P, belong to class S, one extracts the conclusion some P belong
to class S.
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Thus, Störring observed the process of insertion in all his four subjects and
it was the only clearly identifiable strategy when it was at all possible for
participants to report in some detail.  Only recently has this process been
identified by other investigators: As we will see later, Ford (1995),
Stenning & Yule (1997), and Braine (1998) essentially described the same
process, each of them formulating it within his or her own framework.
We leave the Störring investigation only to note that the most important
psychological phenomena associated with syllogism solving were
discovered nearly one hundred years ago by a careful investigator but,
sadly enough, were soon forgotten. It has already been mentioned that
they have been rediscovered, the last one only very recently. We will
engage in an enquiry that will take us much farther back in time, in search
of the origins of the concepts underlying Störring's three main
observations, which we will consider in turn.
The figural effect
Compare the two syllogisms in the first and fourth figure, respectively,
AI-1: all M are P;  some S are M ∴  some S are P, and IA-4: some P are M;  all
M are S ∴  some P are S. Although they are logically equivalent (as a
change in the order of the premises shows) there is general agreement
that the conclusion of the latter follows more "naturally", or more fluently,
than the conclusion of the former. As we have seen, greater ease of the
fourth figure has nothing mysterious: it is linked with the contiguity of the
two occurrences of the middle term.
Could this have influenced logicians of the past? One would expect a
negative answer because logic is a formal matter, and logicians are not
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expected to be influenced by performance factors. However, most
surprisingly, the question has a positive answer, to be found in the father
of the syllogisms himself. Before this, a brief historical foray into the
formulation of syllogisms is in order. Lukaciewicz (1958) points out that
the current formulation of syllogisms, which follows a tradition fixed a
long time ago, (note 5) differs sharply from Aristotles'. Only one
difference will concern us: our current use of the copula IS A/ ARE  in
categorical sentences such as in some S are M, differs from Aristotle's
formulation, who used either M is predicated of some S, or M belongs to some
S.  Consequently, we state the terms in an order that is the reverse of
Aristotle's formulation. The same obtains for the three other categorical
sentences. This inversion has a remarkable consequence. Take for instance
the AI syllogism in the first figure. While it is nowadays expressed as all M
are P;  some S are M, the original syllogism was P is predicated of all M;  M is
predicated of some S, so that the occurrences of the middle term appeared in
contiguity in the first figure, not in the fourth figure as is the case in the
tradition. Notice that the first figure is the only one in which such a
contiguity occurs.
We are now in a position to answer our question and will concern
ourselves with Aristotle's notion of perfect syllogism. As we will see later,
Aristotle's main method of proof is to transform the syllogism under
study into one belonging to a small set, the perfect syllogisms, whose
truth is regarded as evident. The perfect syllogisms are essential because,
in modern terms, they play the role of axioms of the system. Patzig (1968)
discusses at length Aristotle's reasons for considering the truth of some
syllogisms as evident; in other words, the question is, What are the formal
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properties that qualify a syllogism to be regarded as evident by Aristotle?
Now, it turns out that all the perfect syllogisms are in the first figure  but
logically they need not be in the first figure because there are alternative
possible axiomatic choices. Patzig's answer is that the formal property
consists in the immediate connection between the premises offered by the
middle term, a feature possessed only by the first figure.
So, we reach this remarkable conclusion: in all likelihood, Aristotle based
the perfect-imperfect partition of syllogisms on a formal property, namely
the contiguity of the occurrences of the middle term, which has a
psychological import rather than a logical one: it is this contiguity which
provides the syllogism with greater evidence.
In summary, the identification of the role of the figure as a source of
difficulty (or rather, of easiness) is to be found in Aristotle himself, a fact
that has been concealed because of the choice made after him to formulate
the relational term that links the subject and the predicate of categorical
sentences: this formulation resulted in removing the characteristic feature
of the first figure and in transferring it to the fourth figure instead (a
figure which, in addition, was discarded by Aristotle for reasons that are
beyond the scope of this paper).
The analogical strategy and the representation of categorical
propositions
Many people, starting with Störring's subjects, associate diagrams with
syllogism solving. Since the 17th century, various kinds of diagram have
been proposed by logicians to represent syllogisms and how to solve
them. Although Euler is often credited with the invention of the circles
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that are named after him, he was in fact preceded by Leibniz, who
developed not only the circles, but also a straight lines representation.
Bochenski (1970) mentions that both kinds of diagram can even be traced
back to earlier logicians in the 17th century (note 6).
Later, there have been various kinds of diagrams to represent and solve
syllogisms (for a survey of some methods developed in the nineteenth
century, see Gardner, 1958). The most famous, and no doubt the most
practical method, is that of Venn diagrams (which, it is reminded, are
made of three mutually intersecting circles whose overlaping parts and
common borders are shaded or marked by a cross in order to encode the
mood of the syllogism). But Venn diagrams are an automatized method
to encode the premises, work out a solution, and decode it. They have two
characteristics: they are external representations, and they support an
algorithmic method of resolution (and in this sense are operative). No
claim of psychological validity (as internal representation) has been made
for Venn diagrams. Such a claim does not seem tenable because it is hard
to see how the eight areas defined by the three overlaping circles and the
areas obtained by addition or subtraction of these could ever be kept in
working memory; it is precisely the power of the graphical method to
help visualize so many areas that makes the method efficacious.
Leibniz's straight line diagrams
Leibniz's diagrams are described in an undated 18-page opuscule.
In the line diagrams, a class is represented by a straight line, and the two
classes of a categorical sentence by two parallel lines whose ends are
determined by the relation that the two classes entertain. The four basic
categorical sentences are represented in Figure 1. The vertical dotted lines
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indicate that a statement is made relating the two classes.
------------------------------------
Figure 1 near here
------------------------------------
 To represent a syllogism, the major premise is placed on lines one and
two (with the middle term on line two) and the minor premise on lines
two and three. By considering lines one and three, which represent the
relation between the end terms, one produces the vertical dotted lines if
necessary, and read off the solution. An example is given in Figure 2, in
which it can be noticed how easy it is to read the solution.
------------------------------------
Figure 2 near here
------------------------------------
There is a remarkable feature in Leibniz's lines: whereas a horizontal line
represents the extension of a class, a vertical line represents a single
member; consequently, the intersecting points of a vertical line with the
three horizontal lines describes one single entity that can be considered
from the point of view of its belonging to either one of the classes or to
more than one class (when there is more than one intersection). The same
obtains of course with circle diagrams: one point in the common part of,
say, S and M can be viewed as an S individual or an M individual. The
important idea underlying Leibniz's representation, whether in lines or in
circles, is that an individual (e.g. a point in A) that is considered qua A can
also be considered qua B whenever the two classes A and B intersect each
other: it enables a multiple characterization, and a subsequent change in
perspective (the topic, or subject shifting from one class to another one).
What use did Leibniz make of his diagrams? The answer is the same for
the straight lines and for the circles, as they are isomorphic: they were
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used for illustration purposes, each concludent syllogism being
accompanied by one single line diagram together with its unique circle
diagram  counterpart. To some extent, Leibniz chose for each sylllogism
one prototypical diagram (often the only possible one, of course); the
point is that he did not envisage the possible multiple configurations for
each syllogism.
The current psychological theory that makes extensive use of diagrams is
the mental model theory. Leibniz's lines share two important features
with diagrams used by mental model theory: (i) the extension of a class is
represented along a line (a graphical line in the former case, an alignment
of a number of tokens in the latter case); and (ii) the relation between two
classes is captured by the relative position or shift of the two lines along
their common direction, allowing for the presence or the absence of
members common to the two classes on a perpendicular line.
Euler's circles
The definition of Euler's circles and how he used them can be found in a
few of his Lettres à une Princesse d'Allemagne, written in 1761. The author's
aim is essentially a didactical exposition of the theory of the syllogism (and
indeed it is a remarkable achievement from this point of view). It is
doubtful that the author had a stronger objective in mind, such as offering
a method of proof. Referring to his way of representing propositions, he
says: "this way will disclose [French nous découvrira ] the correct forms of
all the syllogisms", an ambiguous expression which, as we will see, should
be interpreted in its loose sense: Euler's aim is more to illustrate than to
demonstrate. Another consequence of this genre of exposition (letters
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written by a tutor do not constitute a treatise) is that what is gained in
clarity is often lost in conceptual depth: Euler seldom elaborates to justify
his method.
After remarking that
since a general notion contains an infinity of individual objects, it is
regarded as a space in which all these individuals are enclosed
Euler gives the representation of the four propositions as in Figure 3.
------------------------------------
Figure 3 near here
------------------------------------
Notice that the A proposition is given a strict inclusion representation.  For
the I proposition,
a part of space A will lie inside space B, as it is well visible that
some thing that is contained in notion A is also contained in
notion B.  
Accordingly, the letters A and B in the diagram (Figure 3c) denote two
spaces which do not have the same status: while B labels the B class (or
notion), A marks the area which captures the concept of a common part to
two notions (and foreshadows the concept of set intersection). Similarly,
the representation of the O proposition is defined as follows:
a part of space A must lie out of space B [. . .]; here it will be noticed
chiefly that there is something in notion A which is not comprised
in notion B, or which lies out of this notion.  
and while the letter B in the diagram (Figure 3d) just labels the B class, the
letter A marks the area crucial to represent the concept of the part of A
that is not B (the difference between A and B in set-theoretical terms)
which may be all or only part of the A class. This distinction is confirmed
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by the fact that in Figure 3d, A and B are symmetrical, which by parity
would invite the unfortunate interpretation that some B are not A, were
the notational difference just mentioned not kept in mind.  It is with these
four diagrams only that Euler tackles the task of identifying the valid
syllogisms (and showing in passing how to identify the invalid ones). A
century earlier, Leibniz's had made exactly the same choice for the
representation of the four basic sentences.
Euler's method is the following. First, make the single diagram that
represents the major premise (so representing the relation between M and
P). Second, integrate the minor premise by (i) placing S with respect to M,
which is easy because there is only one way of representing a proposition,
while (ii) considering at the same time whether S can have different
positions in relation to P. These relative positions are among the following
three: the notion S is either entirely contained in the notion P (inclusion),
or partly contained (overlaping), or outside (exclusion). In brief, for any
syllogism, it will be necessary to draw one, or two, or at most three
diagrams.
Let us illustrate with the EI-1 syllogism: no M are P;  some S are M.  Given
that the notion M is entirely out of the notion P,
if the notion S has a part contained in the notion M, this part will
certainly lie out of the notion P, like in Figure 4a; or in that way
(Figure 4b), or yet in (Figure 4c):
 ------------------------------------
Figure 4 near here
------------------------------------
Although this explanation is clear and convincing (so much that, in fact,
one could nearly dispense with the diagrams) the usage of the diagrams is
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somehow incoherent. In effect, we could expect Euler to look for the
conclusion by trying to identify in each diagram, in terms of S and P, one
of the four basic propositional relations which he has defined. For
instance in diagram 4c, the definitional pattern of an O sentence appears
between S and P. However, Euler does not exploit this.  Instead, he makes
a non-definitional, intuitive use of the diagrams to support his
demonstration (based on a container-content interpretation of the
sentences). In the present case, the part common to M and S (in which S is
aptly written) is considered in isolation and shown to lie necessarily out of
P  because it is part of M; but being as well part of S it can be designated
as some S, hence the conclusion some S is not P. This applies to all three
diagrams (4a, b, and c). There is one good reason for this usage of the
diagrams, which appears clearly on diagrams 4a and 4b: these exhibit
respectively the two interpretations of the O sentence which Euler has not
considered in his definitional diagram; as a consequence he is prevented
from reading the O relation between S and P off each diagram; rather, as
just seen, he argues in terms of the relation between the intersection
labelled S, and P.
Notice that in Euler's usage of the diagrams, it is not even necessary to
draw more than one diagram. For instance, even an undetermined
diagram such as the one given in Figure 5 demonstrates that P and M
lying entirely out of each other, any part of M cut out by S will remain out
of P (assuming the border of S to be closed and convex) (note 7).
Interestingly, Leibniz gives exactly the same diagram as Euler's 4a for EI-1,




Figure 5 near here
------------------------------------
Thus, one can wonder why Euler took the trouble to represent multiple
diagrams of syllogisms. This is necessary in order to be exhaustive, only if
diagrams are used as a search procedure to identify the conclusion in
terms of each basic proposition. For example, for the EI-1 syllogism, one
can interpret the relation between the S and P terms and notice that the
only solution compatible with the three diagrams is the O sentence. This is
very much reminiscent of the mental model theory, and indeed the three
diagrams are identical with those produced by this theory.  However, this
agreement does not always obtain. There are several reasons for that. One
is just some carelessness on the part of the author; for example, for the
OA-2 syllogism, he gave two diagrams (the same ones as mental model
theory) but in the preceding letter he gave only one diagram for the AO-2
syllogism even though he recognized that it was the same as OA-2 (the
latter being non standard), which he discarded as redundant for that
reason. Another reason is that there are optional parts in the diagrams of
mental model theory, which on some occasions yields fewer diagrams
than Euler's method (e.g. one diagram instead of two for IA-4). Yet
another, more fundamental reason, is due to the restriction imposed by
having a single diagram for each sentence, which cuts the combinatorial
analysis. Interestingly, on only four occasions does this lead to an
ambiguous conclusion: on AO-2 for the reason noticed earlier, and on OA-
3, IA-3, and IA-4 the two diagrams support both an O and an I solution.
The unwarranted solution would be eliminated if the O (resp. I) premise
was allowed a possible exclusion (resp. inclusion) interpretation.
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Back to the question raised, we can speculate that although Euler made a
figurative usage of his diagrams, he must have recognized the potential
operative usage of them as a method of proof. The necessity of the
combinatorial exploitation which such a usage implies must have been so
compelling that he could not refrain from applying it even though his
figurative usage of the diagrams did not require it.
There is, however, one domain where it was appropriate to look for
alternative diagrams, namely the identification of the invalid forms. Here
the method is straightforward: try to show that the relation of S to P can
be either an exclusion, or an overlap, or an inclusion. For this, three
diagrams are required. Euler provided the demonstration for IA-1 and IA-
3 together, for II-1 and II-3, and also for the non standard IE-1 and IE-3
considered from a standard point of view. He did not review the other
cases, including the cases (the EO and OE syllogisms) where the method
fails (yielding an O solution) again for lack of considering the exclusive
interpretation of the O sentence.
To summarize, Euler did not develop an algorithmic use of the diagrams
that would enable one to identify the valid syllogisms and provide their
conclusion. This would have required different definitions of the basic
diagrams (about which more below). To such an operative usage of
diagrams, he preferred a figurative usage supporting  the interpretation of
the various syllogisms. This interpretation in turn reflects the
interpretation of the IS A relation in terms of container-content which he
chose for didactical reasons:
the foundation of all these forms [of syllogisms] consists, in short, in
these two principles on the nature of container and content: (i) all
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that is in the content is also in the container. (ii) all that is out of the
container is also out of the content.
The extraordinary ease with which syllogisms seem to be understood, and
even most of the time solved, under a container-content construal of them
is certainly of great psychological interest. Consider for instance the OA-3
syllogism which is very seldom passed, and let us follow the royal tutor:
Assume [. . .] that a part of the notion A lies out of the notion B. In
that case, if the third notion C contains the notion A entirely, it will
certainly also have a part out of notion B [. . . ], hence this
syllogism: some A are not B;  all A are C; therefore some C are not
B.
Euler's explanations consist in reformulating the argument, replacing  all
ARE, no ARE, some ARE, some ARE NOT with is entirely contained in, is
entirely out of, is partly in, is partly out respectively, and this sems enough to
deeply modify the task. Apparently, the human being (who, as shown by
nearly a century of experiments and over two millennia of painful
exposition to logic treatises), is not cognitively equiped to solve the
majority of the syllogisms worded with the underdetermined IS A
relation), seems to become an expert (admittedly, experimental data are
missing) at solving the same syllogisms worded in container-content
terms. A possible reason for this will be considered later.
Gergonne's circles
We have noticed Euler's choice of one and only one diagrammatic
representation for each proposition (and the unfortunate consequences of
this choice from a proof-oriented point of view). The consideration of the
five possible relative positions of two circles in the same plane (the circles
Syllogistic Reasoning 18
representing two "ideas", one being a subject and the other a predicate) is
due to Gergonne (1816-1817) (note 8). He  expounded the correspondence
between the four propositions of the natural language and the five logical
relations, which by now has become familiar, not by giving the mapping
of the former onto the latter, but in the form of two tables. The mapping
between the four propositions and the five diagrams is given in Figure 6
using the symbols proposed by Gergonne for each of the five relations
(note 9).
 ------------------------------------
Figure 6 near here
------------------------------------
The relations can be paraphrased as follows (notice the explicit
quantification of the predicate):
- P X Q:  a part of P is part of Q;
- P ⊃ Q:  a part of P is the whole of Q
- P c Q:  the whole of P is a part of Q;
- P I Q:  the whole of P is the whole of Q;
- P H Q:  no part of P is a part of Q.
The Gergonne correspondence displays the semantics of quantified
sentences and it is far more complicated than a one to one
correspondence. It poses the following questions: (i) the semantic
question: why is the mapping not one to one? (ii) the pragmatic questions:
how does one restrict the number of choices from diagram to
propositions and from proposition to diagrams? (iii) the psycholinguistic
question: given a proposition, are all its related diagrams psychologically
equivalent?
The first question is why natural languages have not evolved to produce
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one and only one expression for each relation. One putative answer, based
on the general assumption that language reflects cognitive constraints, is
the following. Given any two concepts, in the absence of a priori
knowledge about the world, an individual is not in a position to express a
judgment coinciding with any of the five basic states or relations, but this
state of ignorance changes with experience. Take some of our ancestors
who may have had no a priori judgment about the relative extension of
mushrooms and poisonous things. One of them has a bad experience and
it may be important to communicate belief in this newly discovered state
of the world where there are poisonous mushrooms; this can be
communicated by a unique expression, namely, in our evolved language,
some. At this stage, the fifth relation is eliminated but there is not enough
information to know which of the four diagrams for some obtains: this is
matter of further experience or of systematic enquiry. Only after more
data have been gathered will it be possible to know (or at least start
knowing) which is the state of the world (note 10). In brief, because there
is not enough information, the new belief, some mushrooms are poisonous,
has to be communicated without qualification. Now, some more
experience may reveal two different states of the world:
- One, that there are occasions when no poisoning occurs after eating
mushrooms. Communicating this revised belief may have survival
interest if mushrooms is the only food available. This can be done by
qualifying some  (i) either by only:  only some mushrooms are poisonous;  (ii) or
by using a negation: some mushrooms are poisonous but some are not.  Either
of diagrams 1 and 2 refer to this state. Which one is the case again may still
not be decidable for lack of information but nevertheless the judgment
which both represent can be communicated as indicated.
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- Two, that there is always poisoning after eating mushrooms, in which
case there is a need to extend some;  the linguistic device all  does just that:
all mushrooms are poisonous communicates this new belief compatible only
with diagrams 3 and 4 (and again this will suffice pending new
information). It seems that there is no lexical device in English to further
distinguish the two diagrams for all and also (in the backgroung
knowledge that some is the case) the two diagrams for only some (or some
are not).
To summarize: after the very first experience, in a language lexicalized
with the five relations, one would have to state: PX Q  or P ⊃  Q  or P c Q
or P I Q   in order to express the important belief that there are P that are
Q: some P are Q  fulfills this purpose much more economically. Similarly, by
iteration of the same principle, in a situation of emergency it is more
appropriate to state only some P are Q  than PX Q  or P ⊃  Q, and also all P
are Q  than P c Q  or P I Q.  In brief, the mapping between relative
extensions of properties in the world and natural language seems optimal
from the viewpoints of ease and efficiency in communicating information:
natural language is well adapted as it is.
The second question concerns the pragmatics of quantifiers and it will be
treated succintly. Consider first the mapping from right to left: on each of
the five cases it is one to two. The problem is to decide which of the two
verbal expressions to choose and we shall see that this choice is
determined by considerations of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986),
which in turn depend on the background assumptions about the hearer's
beliefs. We assume each time that the speaker is knowledgeable, i. e. , that
she has obtained enough evidence to support the relation under
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consideration.
The first two relations, P X Q and P ⊃ Q, are mapped onto I and O and will
be treated together. The relevant information is the one that helps the
hearer to eliminate states of the world. The speaker choses a some sentence
or a some are not sentence on the basis of her assumptions about the
hearer's beliefs regarding the states of the world that obtain. Suppose an
initial background where P H Q is already known to be false (i. e. , where,
by elimination, the background is made of the first four relations); then
the relevant contrast is between the first two and the next two relations,
so that a some not sentence is appropriate because it eliminates the third
and fourth states. On the contrary, in a initial background of uncertainty
with regard to P H Q, the relevant contrast is between all first four
relations on the one hand and P H Q on the other hand, and a some
sentence is appropriate because it eliminates P H Q. (The speaker may
even use the awkward some are and some are not  sentence if both pieces of
information are estimated useful to the hearer as an additional contrast
against P c Q and P I Q when P H Q is uncertain). Logically, the choice
amounts to a detachment from I&O: detach I or detach O, whichever is
relevant. The same applies to the P ⊃ Q relation.
Suppose now the speaker believes one of the next two relations (P c Q or
P I Q); there is a similar choice to be made, but this time between all and
some:  in an initial background where P H Q is known to be false, an all
sentence is appropriate because it enables the hearer to eliminate the first
two relations; whereas in an initial background where P H Q is uncertain,
both all and some are logically appropriate: some eliminates P H Q, and all
eliminates P H Q and also P X Q and P ⊃  Q.
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For instance, suppose the wizzard has made many trials and concludes
that the local mushrooms and poisonous food are related as per P c Q or P
I Q.  In order to convey this discovery to someone who believes that
some mushrooms are poisonous, he will say that all mushrooms are
poisonous, so contrasting P I Q (or P c Q) with the other three relations,
thereby eliminating them. But if the hearer's background knowledge is
ignorance, there are logically two possible utterances: all mushrooms are
poisonous, because it contrasts with P H Q and also with P X Q and P ⊃  Q,
and some mushrooms are poisonous, because it contrasts with P H Q.
However, while the all sentence, which eliminates the most states of the
world, is optimally relevant to express the P c Q (or the P I Q) relation, the
some sentence is not, because it eliminates fewer states (only the P H Q
state). This means that, given a presumption of optimal relevance, a some
sentence is not appropriate to express the P c Q (or the P I Q) relation.
Therefore, if a some sentence is used, the hearer can infer that among the
relations mapped onto some, only the other relations than P c Q (or the P I
Q), namely P X Q (or P ⊃  Q) are being expressed. This inference is the
source of the well-known conversational implicature (Grice, 1975, Horn,
1989) which gives to some its interpretation some but not all and
countermands its use to express an all state of the world (note 11). The
same situation obtains, mutatis mutandis, for the no/some not opposition as
for the all/some opposition, for the same reasons and need no specific
treatment; there is only a change in the background assumption which is
(P c Q or P I Q)  instead of P H Q.
Before taking up the psycholinguistic question, it will be useful to
complement the correspondence with the converse propositions. The
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mathematical formalism, with P in the first position and Q in the second
one, conceals that in ordinary language the converses are very natural: for
instance, the X relation can be characterized as naturally by some Q are not
P as by some P are not Q; still such converses do not appear in Gergonne's
first two tables. (They appear later in another form).  So, at this stage, the
mapping fails to exhaust the meaning of the diagrams. This is why a more
complete mapping is presented in Figure 7, in which some Q are not P
(noted O') and all Q are P (noted A') have been introduced.
------------------------------------
Figure 7 near here
------------------------------------
Now, on the right of Table 7 there appears a formula for each relation,
which shows that they all are a conjunction of three propositions. For
example, an exhaustive description of the first diagram P X Q is: some P are
Q and some P are not Q and some Q are P. It will be noticed that across the
first four relations, I is an invariant, as expected since they all are mapped
onto I; similarly, O is an invariant across relations X,  ⊃ ,  and H; and A is
invariant across relations c and I; while E is of course invariant for its
single relation H; similar invariance obtains for A' and O'.
For each proposition type in turn, we can now ask the question, Is there a
diagram, that is, a formula, more fundamental than the others? The
answer is easy, and it is affirmative. It results from the observation that
for each formula except the first, one or two of the components are
logically implied by another one: I is implied by A as well as by A', and O
and O' are implied by E. The definitional sentential components of each
relation have been underlined accordingly.
The simplest case is the E proposition for which there is nothing to add:  it
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has only one diagram. Next, the A proposition has two equally
fundamental diagrams: in both the c and the I diagrams, A is a definitional
component.  Contrary to what is generally claimed, there is not one single
logically "correct" diagram to represent the A sentence (supposed to be the
strict inclusion c, while the identity I would result from a conversion
error): there are two equally correct representations differring by their
third components, which negate each other: in one case it is A', the
converse of A, and in the other case it is O'. A testable consequence of this
claim is that people should be willing to identify A sentences with both
diagrams equally (provided, of course, that the sentence does not refer to
known states of the world in which one, and only one, of the diagrams
obtains).
The O proposition has three diagrams but in the last one (H) the O
component is obtained by inference, so that for some not there are two
diagrams which do not require an inference and are fundamental for that
reason, viz. X and ⊃. Again, a testable consequence is that people should
be reluctant to identify the H diagram with some not, whereas they should
equally accept X and ⊃ as representations for it.
Finally, the I proposition has four diagrams but only in the X relation is
the I component not inferred, so that although the four diagrams are
logically correct, one of them is psychologically more fundamental than
the others because it does not require an inference for the concept of
"common part" to be identified in the diagram. The testable consequence is
that people should show a preference for the overlap relation (note 12).
Studies of the comprehension of quantified sentences confirm that the
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overlaping position plays a more fundamental role, similar to that of a
prototype. For example, in Begg & Harris' (1982) study, when people
were asked to distribute 100 points over the five Gergonne diagrams, for
the I sentence the overlaping position received the absolute majority of
the points (63%) while the next choice (P c Q) received only 21% of the
points. Interestingly, for the O sentence, the points were equally shared by
the overlaping (45%) and the B included in A (44%) diagrams, as predicted
by the inferential analysis just proposed. And similarly for the A sentence,
people's choices were not far from equality between identity (I : 57%) and
inclusion (c : 43%).
Coming back to Euler's choice of diagrams to represent propositions, one
is better able to explain what must have motivated it. His didactical
obligations may have recommended a single diagram for the sake of
simplicity, but why precisely the overlaping configuration for the I
proposition? Our analysis answers this question: the I proposition has one
diagram provided with the proprerty of greater ease for judgment of
representation, namely the overlaping position. For the O and A
propositions, Euler's choice coincides with one of the diagrams that we
have identified as equally easy. Notice that Leibniz's choice for
representing the four basic sentences was exactly the same; this is
interesting because in all likelihood Euler was not aware of Leibnz's
diagrams, which were discovered and published only in the first years of
the twenteeth century.
Finally, what is the psychological plausibility that the Gergonne diagrams
be the basis for a mental representation of quantified propositions? The
one-to-several mapping between linguistic quantifiers and diagrams is a
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common argument against this plausibility (Johnson-laird & Bara, 1984)
because of a "combinatorial explosion" when integrating two
propositions. However, the argument is not compelling: people might
limit their usage of the correspondence to the preferred diagrams (just as
Euler did), or they could have a more flexible representation in which
there is, for each proposition, one basic diagram marked with compulsory
and optional parts; this proposal was made by Whetherick (1993) and
applied by Stenning & Oberlander (1995). For instance, in Whetherick's
representation, a some sentence is based on the basic overlapping position;
but only the central "lens" is drawn with a continuous line, while the left
and right arcs are drawn with a dotted line whose limits indicate optional
areas. With reference to Figure 7, this diagram shows an X relation
underlining the invariance of I (the common part); suppressing the left
dotted line, or the right one, or both, amounts to negating O, or O', or
both in the formula I&O&O', so changing the diagram into I&A&O' (P c
Q), or I&O&A' (P ⊃ Q), or I&A&A' (P I  Q), respectively.
The verbal strategy
Recent investigations
We will consider first the modern versions of Störring's insertion strategy
and begin with Ford (1995). About one half of her subjects exhibited on
the majority of the syllogisms what she calls a "substitution behavior", that
is, replacing one term in a premise with another, as if solving an algebraic
problem. The substitution also appeared in the form of arrows linking
terms in the premises, or in the form of terms crossed and replaced with
another term. Using the IA-4 syllogism as an example (some P are M;  all M
are S), Ford says that the second premise allows one to give the value of S
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to M; the value of S can be substituted for M in the first premise, giving
the conclusion. This amounts to collapsing Störring's insertion and
abstraction processes (note 13).
Ford formalizes the substitution procedure as follows. The premise that
provides the replacement term plays the role of a rule relating
membership of class C and property P, while the premise that contains the
term to be replaced provides specific objects whose status with regard to
C or P is known. The following rules guide the process of substitution:
A. If a rule exists affirming of every member of the class C the
property P then (1) whenever a specific object, O, that is a member
of C is encountered it can be inferred that O has the property P, and
(2) whenever a specific object, O, that lacks property P is
encountered it can be inferred that O is not a member of C.
B. If a rule exists denying of every member of the class C the
property P then (1) whenever a specific object, O, that is a member
of C is encountered it can be inferred that O does not have the
property P, and (2) whenever a specific object, O, that possesses the
property P is encountered it can be inferred that O is not a member
of C. (Ford, 1995, p 21).
Notice that individual objects are introduced, an important point about
which more will be said later. Apart from this novelty, there is formally
nothing new in these rules. They were already spelled out (in their
universal formulation) three hundred years ago in the Logic of Port-
Royal. In the chapter on syllogisms, Arnauld and Nicole formulate the
principle of the affirmative moods  for the first figure as follows: "that which
applies to an idea taken universally, also applies to all that of which this
idea is affirmed." Using Ford's names for classes, the property P which
applies to all the C also applies to the object O of which C is affirmed: this
is rule A1. Similarly, the principle of the negative moods  (still for the first
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figure) says that "that which is denied of an idea taken universally is
denied of all that of which this idea is affirmed." In other words, the
property P denied of all the C is also denied of the object O of which C is
affirmed: this is rule B1. In fact, these two principles of the first figure have
a much longer history: they were referred to by the Scholastic logicians, in
a more synthetic formulation including both of them, as the dictum de omni
et nullo.
Finally, the principle of the AEE and AOO moods for the second figure given
by the Port-Royal logic expresses rule A2: "whatever is included in the
extension of a universal idea does not apply to any of the subjects of
which it is denied." That is, being part or whole of those C which have the
property P does not apply to those O of which P is denied (note 14). In
brief, Ford claims that her rules, which are the singular counterparts of
formal principles identified by logicians of the past, have psychological
reality, and she relates her claim to the fact that A1 and B1 are equivalent
to modus ponens,  and A2 and B2 are equivalent to modus tollens.   
We now turn to Braine's (1998) contribution. In his essay on mental-
predicate logic, he deals very shortly with categorical syllogisms. He only
considers the reasons for individual differences in performance and
identifies one of these reasons with possessing or not a strategy for
choosing a secondary topic:
The strategy is to choose as secondary topic the subset of the
subject of which the middle term can or cannot be predicated (the S
that are, or are not, M, as determined by the premise relating S and
M). (p. 321)
Once a secondary topic is chosen, it is transferred into the other premise:
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this executes Störring's insertion process. The resolution then proceeds in
two steps: one is the application of either a generalization of modus ponens
for predicate logic (equivalent to Ford's rules A1 and B1), or, by a reductio
ad absurdum, of a modus tollens  (equivalent to Ford's rules A2 and B2); the
other is a schema of universal or existential generalization. Braine offers
this example (EA-3): none of the M are P;  all of the M are S. The secondary
topic, the S that are M, is provided by the second premise; according to the
first premise, the S that are M are not P (by modus ponens), hence: some S
are not P (by existential generalization).
The notion that the verbal strategy hinges upon the insertion process,
followed by the operation of modus ponens  and modus tollens, appears also
in one of the main hypotheses of Stenning and Yule's (1997) theoretical
approach. They propose that syllogisms exist and are soluble owing to
one of their structural properties, namely the identification of individual
cases. An individual can be characterized by the fact that it possesses, or
does not possess, the properties defined by three categories, S, M, and P
which constitute the premises, so that there are eight types of individual:
S+M+P+;   S+M+P-;   S+M-P+;   S+M-P-;   S-M+P+;   S-M+P-;   S-M-P+;   S-M-
P-. For each syllogism, the joint premises warrant or do not warrant the
existence of such individuals: in the affirmative, the syllogism has a
conclusion. The authors describe two procedures for identifying individual
cases, one analogical by models, the other by rules, which constitute two
different implementations of a common underlying abstract individual
identification algorithm.
For the analogical procedure, the authors apply the graphical algorithm
defined by Stenning & Oberlander (1995). As mentioned above, a
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"combibatorial explosion" ensueing the use of Gergonne diagrams is not
obliged: each diagram has a minimal representation defined by the "critical
regions", that is, those which must exist if the premise is true (these
correspond to the invariants in the Gergonne formulas mentioned above).
A simple procedure follows to integrate the premises. If there remains a
critical region in the diagram restricted to the end terms, this is the
diagram of the conclusion; if not, there is no conclusion.
The verbal procedure is decribed in the form of a three-step algorithm. At
the first step, a "source premise" is selected: this is the premise which will
provide the first two terms of the individual description. One of these is
necessarily the middle term M. At the next step, it is compared with its
occurrence in the other premise from the viewpoint of quality. There are
three possible cases: (i) if the qualities match and M is subject of the other
premise, a modus ponens  is applied whose conclusion (which is the
predicate of the other premise) provides the third term of the individual
description; (ii) if the qualities do not match, and M is the predicate of the
other premise, this means that there is a M+ and a M- , which allows a
modus tollens whose conclusion (which is the subject of the other premise)
provides again the third term of the individual description; (iii) if none of
the two previous cases occurs, there is no conclusion. At the third step, the
M term is eliminated and a quantifier is introduced. We exemplify with
AO-2: all the P are M;  some S are not M. The source premise is the second
premise, which contains a negated M (M-); this provides S+M- for the first
two terms of the individual description. Since in the first premise M is
predicate and affirmative, modus tollens applies: all the P are M;  not-M
yields not-P, that is P-, which completes the individual description to yield
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S+M-P-, hence the conclusion: some S are not P.
In summary, Stenning & Oberlander's verbal algorithm specifies in detail
Störring's insertion and abstraction process. It highlights the commonality
in the approaches that we have considered: the first step is equivalent to,
and specifies, Braine's choice of a secondary topic; the second and third
steps coincide with, and specify Ford's substitution process and application
of rules, as well as Braine's application of inference schemas.
It has been mentioned that Stenning and Yule claim that both of their
algorithms are implementations of a more abstract algorithm for
individual case identification. Thus, this concept would be at the heart of
syllogism solving, and in particular it would account for the process of
insertion in the verbal startegy. The rest of this paper will be devoted to
show that Störring's insertion process and its more recent variants appear
explicitly in Aristotle's writings and that Stenning and Yule's concept of
individual case identification, which seems to capture the essence of the
syllogism, is implicitly present in one of Aristotle's method of proof.  
Aristotle's methods of proof and Ecthesis
As is well-known, in order to identify the concludent modes, Aristotle
distinguished two methods of proof, and a subsidiary one. Since the first
two involve a "reduction" in two different senses, it is wise to follow
Bochenski (1970) and call them the direct, and the indirect method,
respectively.The direct method consists of the transformation of the
syllogism into a perfect one by the conversion of one or both premises; in
addition, depending on the syllogism, it may be necessary to apply one or
both of the following operations: the transposition of the premises, the
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conversion of the conclusion. Thus, this method (often calld method of
conversion for that reason) requires knowledge of the conversion of I and
E propositions: some A are B to some B are A;  no A are B to no B are A;  and
all A are B to some B are A (called conversion by limitation).
Not all syllogisms can be proved by conversion, and a complementary
method is needed. This second method, the indirect method applies a
reductio ad impossibile. Given a syllogism P, Q / C, it consists of conjoining
the negation of the conclusion (not-C) to one of the premises, say P, and
showing that P, not-C / not-Q  is a perfect syllogism. It is a fairly
sophisticated method for non logicians, and one should not expect to find
participants in psychological experiments to apply it (especially when the
conclusion is not provided). In contrast, the direct method, in the simple
cases where only one or two conversions are involved, is easy to execute.
Since the rules of I and E conversion are mastered by a majority of people
(Begg and Harris, 1982; Newstead & Griggs, 1983; Politzer, 1990), one
could expect that some individuals have a strategic use of the direct
method. Unluckily, usual methodology does not allow its identification;
think aloud protocols might be useful to look for this possibility.
All valid syllogisms can be solved by the direct or the indirect method.
However, Aristotle mentions a third method, ecthesis (also called by
classical authors the method of exposition) which he applies only a few times,
and always in a rather allusive manner. This lack of precision, and also the
fact that such an alternative method of proof was not necessary, has
aroused many comments and speculations about Aristotle's motivation
(Kneale & Kneale, 1978). Here is the passage with the most explicit use of
ecthesis, aiming to give the proof of AAI-3 (all M are P;  all M are S  ∴ 
Syllogistic Reasoning 33
some S are P):
. . . if both P and S belong to every M, should one of the Ms, e.g. N,
be taken, both P and S will belong to this, and thus P will belong to
some S. (Analytica Priora, 6, 28a; transl. Ross, names of classes
changed to fit this chapter's notations).
Here Aristotle executes the extraction (which is the meaning of ecthesis) of
"one of the Ms", calls it N, of which P and S are still predicated, and states
that from this it follows that P is predicated of S.
Lukaciewicz points out that, as objected in the third century A.D. by
Alexander of Aphrodisias (one of Aristotle's greatest commentators), in
order for the conclusion to follow, one would have to assume N to be a
sub-class of M and apply AAI-3 to all N are P; all N are S, again an AAI-3
syllogism, which is entirely circular. Rather, Alexander proposed a non-
logical interpretation of the passage, according to which N is an individual
of which it is easy, through perception, to predicate both P and S, and so
realize that some P is S.
In brief, this is a psychological interpretation of Aristotle's obscure passage,
which is of great interest to us because it shows how the intuition of a
logician in the antiquity meets the heuristic followed by logically naïve
individuals in the twentieth century, captured by the first step of Storring's
insertion process: to solve syllogisms, try first to extract an individual out of
one premise.   
But is there not a logical interpretation of Aristotle's passsage above?
Modern analysts of Aristotle's syllogistic agree to answer affirmatively
(Lear, 1980; Lukaciewicz, 1958; Patzig, 1968; Thom, 1981). A logical
interpretation can be given on the assumption that in the present case, as
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in many other occasions, Aristotle limited himself to giving the sketch of a
proof. The analyses diverge in that for Lukaciewicz and Patzig the logical
proof requires an existential quantification over a term; Patzig proposes
the following law for ecthesis:
some B are A ⇔ (∃C) [(all C are A) & (all C are B)]
(and a similar one, mutatis mutandis, for the some not case) from which the
proof for AAI-3 follows easily. However, formally, there are difficulties
linked with the fact that such laws insert syllogistic in propositional logic
and second-order predicate logic.
The other interpretation of ecthesis, based on the extraction of an
individual-variable rather than of a class-variable, does not have these
shortcomings and Thom (1981) shows that it results in a simple system
which contains singular and universal syllogisms. The only two singular
syllogisms in the first figure are axioms. They are (a being an arbitrary
instance of A, b of B, etc.) all B are A;  c is a B ∴  c is an A, and no B are A;  c
is a B ∴  c is not an A. From the rule of proof per impossibile, taken as an
axiom, and the previous two syllogisms, the only two singular syllogisms
in the second figure follow: all B are A;  c is not an A ∴  c is not a B, and no
B  are A;  c is an A ∴  c is not a B.
It will be noticed that these four syllogisms are identical with Ford's rules
A1, B1, A2, B2, respectively. Adding the axiom a is an A, there follows
from the two singular syllogisms in the first figure the following theses: all
A are B ∴ a is a B  and its negative counterpart no A are B ∴ a is not a B
which both capture the concept of extraction of the individual a out of A.
By an application of the first one to b is an A;  b is a C ∴  some C are A
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(which is provable per impossibile  applied to the second singular syllogism
in the first figure) one reproduces Aristotle's proof of AAI-3. It can be seen
that this proof explains Aristotle's by providing the missing step (viz. the
latter syllogism) that made it obscure, while justifying Alexander's
intuitive rendering of it.
In brief, ecthesis is a logically correct method of proof, and comments such
as Alexander's reflect, besides the lack of logical tools to justify it, the
intuitive appeal of the logical principles on which it is based. In didactical
situations, proof by ecthesis is very convincing, a sufficient indication that
it captures something psychologically essential to solve syllogisms.
Nevertheless,  classical logicians lost interest and sight of it, and this had
the unfortunate consequence that it has escaped psychologists' attention,
at least consciously.
In agreement with Stenning & Yule's theory, the operative use of
diagrams (whether Stenning & Oberlander's algorithm or Venn diagram)
and the container-content analogy enable one to solve syllogisms because
they all enable the reasoner to catch simultaneously the three properties
affirmed or denied of an individual (or of a set of individuals) and this
probably captures the essence of syllogism solving. The container-content
analogy is powerful in that it exploits our capacity to view simultaneously
an individual as an A, a B, a C or their negation through a spatial
interpretation of the abstract relation IS A. Now, with respect to this
conceptualization, ecthesis can be viewed as a crucial step in that it primes
the process of identification by providing an individual together with the
first term of the description (a role played by Stenning &Yule's source
premise). Störring's description of his participants' insertion process is the
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counterpart of this logical process observable among those participants
who possess the strategy.
What about ecthesis within Aristotle's writings? It is fascinating that what
seems to be at the heart of the psychology of syllogisms, namely the
capability of extracting an entity in order to make a subsequent multiple
affirmative or negative attribution, surfaces in the writings of the founder
of the syllogistic. The fact that ecthesis was logically unnecessary (that is,
unnecessary to prove the validity of syllogisms in his system), that
Aristotle knew that (having proved all the syllogisms by the two main
methods), but nevertheless used it, attests to its importance from a point
of view different than logical. We can surmise that Aristotle must have
recognized by introspection its role in reasoning, that is, in the mental
process by which he himself, without any doubt a particularly skilled
individual capable of using such a strategy, probably worked out the
solution of some of them. Admittedly, this is pure speculation, but a
psychologist involved in the study of syllogistic reasoning cannot refrain
from considering such a hypothesis.
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Appendix:  A traditional description of categorical propositions and of
syllogisms
Categorical propositions
From an extensional point of view, they affirm or deny that a class S is
included in a class P in whole or in part, which gives four types of
proposition:
all S are P  (universal affirmative, called an A proposition)
no S are P  (universal negative, called an E proposition)
some S are P  (particular affirmative, called an I proposition)
some S are not P  (particular negative called an O proposition)
Categorical syllogisms
 They are deductive arguments made of three categorical propositions: the
two premises and the conclusion. The three propositions taken together
involve three classes, each of which occurs in two propositions. The three
classes are labelled S, P, and M, (called the terms of the syllogism). P (the
major term) occurs in the first premise (called the major premise) and as the
predicate of the conclusion. S (the minor term) occurs in the second
premise (called the minor premise) and as the subject of the conclusion, and
M (the middle term) occurs in each premise but not in the conclusion. These
constraints determine the following four dispositions, called figures:
     1     2     3     4
       major premise M    P              P    M              M    P              P    M
       minor premise S    M              S    M              M    S              M    S
____             _____          _____           _____
       conclusion S     P               S     P               S      P             S      P
For each figure, there are 4(proposition types)3(propositions) = 64 manners of
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constituting a syllogism, called moods.  Combining with the four figures,
this yields 256 syllogisms designated by their abbreviated propositions
and their figure number.  For instance, EIO-1 designates:  no M are P;
some S are M  ∴  some S are not P.
In psychology, the term mood is often used to refer only to the two
premises presented to the participant.  In this special sense, there are only
42 = 16 moods.  Investigators select their problems among 4 (figures) X 16
(moods) = 64 problems called syllogisms although they are only pairs of
premises.  (In this sense, the previous example will be called an EI-1
syllogism, omitting the conclusion O).
With the conventional constraint that the conclusion should have the S
term as a subject and the P term as a predicate (S P conclusion) there are
only 19 valid syllogisms.  But this constraint is hard to maintain when
participants are required to produce their own response: they are free to
give conclusions with P as a subject and S as a predicate as well (P S
conclusions).  After relaxing this constraint, there are 27 valid syllogisms,
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Footnotes
1. The major part of the article is occupied by relational reasoning. It
includes different kinds of two-premise arguments: spatial (e. g.  S is to
the left of D, R is to the right of D ∴  ?); temporal (e. g. action A is
posterior to action C, action D is anterior to action C ∴ ?); linear (F is
longer than K; L is shorter than K ∴ ?); and of equality (e. g.  A = K; P =
K ∴ ?).
2.  A description of syllogisms is given in the Appendix.
3.  The first figure being MP; SM, the inversion of the premises yields SM;
MP which coincides with the fourth figure, as shown by the position of
the middle term (the labels P and S are immaterial).
4.  There is also, while solving an AA-4 syllogism (all the P are M;  all the M
are S) a report of a three-step stair configuration, with S, M, and P terms
on the top, middle, and bottom steps, respectively.
5.  Possibly by Boethius (6th century A.D.) according to Patzig (1968).
6.  Straight lines can be found in Alstedius' (1614) work and circles in
Sturm (1661).
7.  Remarkably, one of Ford's participants did just that for IE-3 (drawing
page 61). This supports the hypothesis that people who use diagrams
may have a figurative, rather than operative, use of them: in that case,
the diagram comes in support of their verbal strategy to illustrate the
principles which they apply at a metacognitive level.
8.  In view of this, the expression "Euler circles" often used to refer to
Gergonne's five diagrams is a clear historical mistake. Although
Gergonne himself explicitly refers to Euler, he correctly remarks that
Euler failed to fully exploit his own idea.
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9.  Gergonne's paper actually does not contain any diagram!
10.  In terms of causality (but this point of view is in no way obligatory) P
c Q is a sufficient condition, P ⊃ Q, a necessary one, P I Q a necessary
and sufficient condition, and P X Q a statistical correlation whose value
depends on the extent of overlaping.
11.  Horn (1989) notes that the Gricean view was anticipated by
philosophers and logicians, starting with J.S. Mill who pointed out the
not all inference made in natural language when interpreting I sentences.
12.  Another prediction concerns reaction times:  it should take them equal
times to make all judgments on c and I diagrams; reaction times for some
not judgments should be equal on X and ⊃ diagrams, and shorter than
on H diagrams; and they should be shorter for some judgments on the X
diagram than in ⊃ , c, and I.
13.  Ford notes that this strategy must be used with care because equating
two terms should not imply their universal equivalence: for example, in
EA-4 (no P are M; all M are S), substituting S for M without precaution
would yield no P are S, which is erroneous). She describes a "sophisticated
substitution" applicable to similar cases.
14.  Arnauld and Nicole did not give the counterpart of this principle for
the moods EAE-2 and EIO-2 (the equivalent of B2) for reasons of
economy: they prefer to justify them by appeal to the principle of the
negative moods for the first figure applied after the conversion of the E
premise (which turns these two syllogisms into the first figure).
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Figure 1.  The representation of the four quantified sentences in Leibniz's
straight lines system.
all A is B A      .             .
         .             .
         .             .
B      .             .                      .
no A is B A                    .            .           
                                  .           .
                         .           .
B     .           .              .
some A is B   A                     .              .
            .    .
            .    .
B                      .              .               .
some A is not B            A      .              .                         .
         .              .         
         .              .
B       .              .                         .
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Figure 2.  Leibniz line diagram for the AA-3 syllogism.
1. P                          .                    .
     .        .
     .        .
2. M        .                    .               
     .         .
     .         .
3. S            .                     .             .
lines 1 & 2:  all M is P
lines 2 & 3:  all M is S
lines 1 & 3:  some S is P
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 Figure 6.  Gergonne's diagrams and their mapping onto the four categorical propositions.
P Q
PQ
  P    Q
   P                            Q
P  X  Q
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Figure 7.  Gergonne's diagrams complemented with converse propositions and their
formulas.
P Q









P X Q  =  I & O & O'
P  ⊃ Q  =  I & O & A'
P c  Q  =  I & A & O'
P I Q  =  I & A & A'
P H Q  =  O & O' & E
